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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of 
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process at the 
National Cooperative Refinery Association in McPherson, Kansas. The 
implementation efforts provided data regarding leaders’ actions, employee 
perceptions, and leadership alignment interventions. Research data gathered 
through 129 paper surveys and 25 group interviews were analyzed to identify 
relationships between work-related demographic indicators and workplace 
attitudes. The final analysis revealed a statistically significant relationship 
between the "alignment" composite and salaried employees, meaning salaried 
employees were more likely to answer positively than hourly employees. 
Secondly, the findings showed a strong association of "role of teams" where 
employees on grassroots safety culture teams and the guidance team were more 
positive than non-team members. 
The key components of leadership alignment were found to be leaders’ 
actions, grassroots and guidance team structure, and leadership alignment 
dialogues. When leaders followed safety policies and procedures, were visible to 
employees, responded to safety concerns in a timely manner, and provided 
detailed safety information, alignment was created. The leadership alignment 
dialogues created alignment when leaders took the time to listen first to concerns 
and not just react, engaged in honest and candid dialogue, and apologized for 
making mistakes. The planned guidance and grassroots team structures and 
projects were recognized by employees as maintaining the National Cooperative 
Refinery Association’s safety culture change efforts. In conclusion, the safety 
culture change process was successful, reducing the National Cooperative 
Refinery Association’s incident and injury rates from 2008 to 2009. To continue to 
improve safety performance, it is recommended the association continue the 
team structure, complete leadership alignment dialogues with all supervisors, 
and target specific units for safety improvement. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Within the safety culture change process, there is a need for leadership 
alignment to be established. Leadership alignment occurs when there is 
consensus for the safety culture implementation strategy at various levels within 
the organization from employee groups to supervision to upper management. 
Leaders must gather employee perceptions to identify true alignment, assumed 
alignment, forced alignment, or skewed alignment around the direction and 
implementation of the safety culture change process. 
Often, when implementing change initiatives, actions begin with aligning 
the assumption leaders. Without establishing alignment, change efforts often fail, 
costing organizations money, time, and trust. In the safety culture change 
process, misalignment within the leadership levels manifests in incomplete safety 
culture projects, lack of employee trust, unwillingness on the part of supervisors 
to invest the time to understand the framework, and higher levels of resistance to 
new cultural norms. If leaders are misaligned, organizations struggle to continue 
the safety culture change process and miss the learning opportunities generated 
by each team’s work, stunting much of the iterative safety culture change 
process. 
Creating shared leadership within the safety culture change process 
through leadership alignment allows participation from all levels of employee 
groups. Participation from all levels of an organization is uncommon in traditional 
hierarchical organizations and provides a framework and language to confront 
power, establishing positive conflict built on trust and respect (Katzenbach & 
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Smith, 2003). The ability to challenge the underlying norms, assumptions, and 
policies within an organization determines the depth and longevity of the safety 
culture change process. 
Flexible patterns of organization strengthen a system’s ability to 
differentiate, integrate, and evolve, and leadership alignment allows 
organizations to deal with external factors in the environment such as safety that 
may impact an organization (Lund & Gjerding, 1996). World-class manufacturing 
organizations view safety as a strategic business priority in line with quality, 
production, and cost. Specifically, in the field of safety, the emerging business 
paradigm has expanded the spectrum of managing safety to include safety 
culture, a leading indicator of safety performance. Safety management from an 
organizational culture perspective moves beyond managing from an engineering, 
enforcement, and education perspective (Simon, 1999). 
The field of safety culture emerged in the 1980s after several catastrophic 
and public disasters. By looking at the perceptions, norms, and assumptions 
within working groups, safety culture addresses the human elements of safety 
and moves safety management from the lagging edge to the leading edge of 
prevention. Safety culture work involves the entire organizational system to 
address and prevent employee risks. As a result, successful safety culture 
initiatives reduce employee incident and injury rates, reduce workers’ 
compensation costs, and increase employee engagement and empowerment. 
Study Purpose 
This study determined the key components of effective leadership 
alignment within the safety culture change process. Specifically, it examined 
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leadership alignment within the implementation of safety culture change process 
at the National Cooperative Refinery Association (NCRA) in McPherson, Kansas. 
The safety culture change process at NCRA was led by Culture Change 
Consultants, Inc. It was one of NCRA’s strategic priorities to be recognized as an 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration voluntary protection programs 
star site for safety performance (U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, n.d.). Researching the implementation efforts of 
NCRA’s safety culture change process provided data regarding leader’s actions, 
employee perceptions, and leadership alignment interventions. 
Safety culture change initiatives are successful when leadership at all 
levels of the organization engage in creating an intentional safety culture. There 
is a need to determine the key components of leadership alignment within the 
safety culture change process to be more deliberate and knowledgeable about 
how leadership alignment impacts specific implementation components and the 
overall change effort within the safety culture change process. Determining the 
key components of leadership alignment within the process may allow for 
organization leaders to lower levels of resistance, increase employee 
engagement, decrease mistrust, and continue change efforts with sustainability 
in mind. 
By involving the different employee groups, the data collected provided 
multiple perspectives for analysis. Including the different groups enabled 
assessment of how all groups are impacted by the level of leadership alignment 
established within the process. This information was valuable to leaders within 
the safety culture change process as they moved forward and continued to 
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improve their safety culture and performance. The results also helped to 
determine who was responsible for alignment, what actions create alignment, 
and what data leaders should gather to determine if alignment exists within the 
change initiative. 
Research Setting 
NCRA in McPherson, Kansas, began in 1943 when five farming 
cooperatives purchased the facility from Globe Oil, who built the facility in 1932 at 
a cost of $1 million. Today, the facility is owned by three member-owners: CHS 
Inc., Growmark, and MFA Oil Company (NCRA, 2009). The plant is a high-
capacity operation processing 85,000 barrels of crude a day into gasoline, diesel, 
and propane. In addition to the production side of the business, the company 
manages more than 60 trucks in the distribution network and more than 1,000 
miles of pipeline. The cooperative supplies refined fuels to farmers across the 
Midwest. With an employee base of 650, this organization produced a net 
income of $567 million in 2007 (76.1% return on equity) and $273 million (35% 
return on equity) in 2008. 
NCRA’s strategic location in the middle of the Great Plains and its 
connection to three pipelines that transport crude oil from Canada, the Rocky 
Mountains, and the Southern United States and marine terminals provide a 
market advantage. Additionally, the company is positioned close to underground 
storage facilities and salt caverns, in Conway, Kansas. This allows the company 
to control when it brings the product to market. In 2008, about 35% of the product 
was loaded onto trucks and shipped to terminals, while the remainder was sold 
directly as pipeline shipments. With the recent record profits, NCRA has begun 
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several capital improvement projects including the Heavy Crude Expansion 
Project, part of the clean fuels project slated for completion in 2010, which will 
allow the refinery to tap into the 435,000 barrels a day of Canadian heavy sour 
crude arriving in Cushing, Oklahoma (NCRA, 2009). 
From a safety performance standpoint, over the past 3 years, the accident 
rate at the refinery has decreased and NCRA was recognized with the Refiners 
Association Gold Safety Award, along with the safety management award from 
its majority owner, CHS, Inc. The structures in place to manage safety at the 
refinery consist of a safety council of four people, the safety department, and a 
behavior-based safety program. This structure is responsible for the employee 
safety in 10 different areas across the facility including: OIP; MAP; Feed Unit; 
Clean Fuels, Unicracker, Hydrogen Units (ALKY Unit); CAT Unit; R&F Unit; 
Pumphouse, Truck Sales, Tank Farm, Conway Underground Storage (TCC); 
Boilerhouse; and Maintenance. However, with a rate of 3.2 total recordable 
incident and injury cases in 2008, NCRA’s safety performance was below the 
petroleum refining industry average of 0.7 recordable injuries and illnesses per 
100 full-time workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.). Within the 3.2 total cases 
figure, there were 1.4 lost time incidents, 1.8 restricted day and lost time 
incidents, and 18.8 lost work days. From a safety management perspective, 
NCRA’s safety performance had reached a plateau and did not include a safety 
culture component. To improve its safety performance and continue reducing 
safety incidents and accidents, the NCRA senior leadership, including both salary 
and union employees, chose to implement the safety culture change process 
facilitated by Culture Change Consultants, Inc. 
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In August 2008, NCRA began the safety culture change process with an 
Achieving World Class Safety workshop for employees. The workshop objectives 
included enlisting and educating leaders, understanding the basic concept of 
safety culture change, and creating buy-in for the process. In September 2008, 
the Culture Change Consultants, Inc. safety culture assessment was 
administered to 367 employees, followed by focus groups interviews with 20% of 
the respondents to produce the NCRA safety culture assessment report. The 
safety culture assessment report was fed back to 65 employees in November 
2008 with the key findings, recommendations, and survey data. From the findings 
of the report, NCRA chose to move forward with creating a safety culture 
guidance team and safety culture grassroots teams as the structure responsible 
for facilitating the safety culture change process. 
Crucial to the success of this project was a safety manager at NCRA and 
internal safety culture change champion who coordinated all activities on site. 
The safety culture guidance team formed in January 2009 and consisted of five 
salaried and four union employees, including the vice president of refining, 
director of human resources, operations manager, safety manager, MAP 
supervisor, the vice president of the union, and three veteran union members. In 
March 2009, two supervisor awareness workshops were held to allow 
supervisors and middle managers to learn about the safety culture change 
concepts and ask follow up questions. There was some push back from the 
middle managers about the commitment of senior level executives to stay the 
course with the safety culture change process, and supervisor interviews were 
held to clarify the supervisors’ perspectives. In April 2009, four safety culture 
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grassroots teams were chartered by the guidance team to work on safety culture 
projects related to the findings in the November 2008 safety culture assessment 
report. In February 2010, the first of three leadership alignment dialogue 
sessions was held with 18 salaried employees, including the vice president of 
operations and the vice president of refining. 
The specific setting for this research was the employee group at the 
NCRA. NCRA is in Year 2 of its safety culture change initiative and has 
completed several safety culture change interventions including: the Achieving 
World Class Safety Workshop, a Safety Culture assessment and report, a 2-day 
Safety Culture Report feedback session, a leadership team meeting, formation of 
a guidance team, two 1-day supervisor awareness sessions, supervisor focus 
groups, formation of four grassroots teams, and a guidance team and grassroots 
team health check. Additionally, NCRA has sent 76 employees to the Culture 
Change Consultants, Inc.’s 3-day workshop “Implementing Safety Culture 
Change through Grassroots Leadership.” Starting in August 2008, NCRA made a 
significant effort to involve employee groups, build consensus among the union 
and management, and educate its employees about the safety culture initiative. 
NCRA was chosen for the research setting because the researcher has been 
involved from the initial workshops and was the lead consultant on the project. 
Additionally, the researcher has an excellent working relationship with Scott 
Swanson, the internal safety culture change project manager. 
NCRA has a dedicated guidance team and grassroots team structure for 
implementing the safety culture change initiative. NCRA’s four grassroots teams 
are made up of hourly employees along with one supervisor, whereas the 
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guidance team is comprised of four union and six salaried employees. 
Additionally, NCRA has provided training to employees who were not on one of 
the dedicated teams and sought supervisor perceptions through training, 
dialogues, focus groups, and surveys. Data were collected from employees on a 
dedicated safety culture team, employees participating in the process but not on 
a team, and employees who have not participated in the process. 
NCRA, located in McPherson, Kansas, has 610 employees and is the 
major employer and economic engine within this small, rural, agricultural-
centered community of roughly 15,000 people. Not only is safety a priority for the 
company, but also for the nearby McPherson community located less than two 
miles from the refinery grounds. Data were collected from many groups because 
of a previous working relationship with Culture Change Consultants, Inc. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter 2 is a literature review of major concepts within the field of 
leadership alignment and safety culture, including current research on leadership 
alignment, defining safety culture, a model of safety culture, characteristics of a 
safety culture, a comparison of culture-based safety versus behavior-based 
safety, and the current leadership alignment practices within safety management. 
Chapter 3 includes the research methods designed to gather sufficient 
data to address key components of effective leadership alignment within a safety 
culture change process. Phase 1 of the research includes a paper survey 
designed to identify alignment at both salaried and hourly levels. Phase 2 of the 
research gathers qualitative data through interviews and focus groups for both 
9 
 
salaried and hourly levels. Phase 3 identifies specific actions and structures 
within the safety culture change process creating alignment. 
Chapter 4 provides the results of the data gathered to investigate effective 
leadership alignment at NCRA. Chapter 4 is comprised of a survey analysis and 
interview analysis section. Finally, chapter 5 provides a brief summary of the 
findings and draws conclusions. Chapter 5 also identifies the limitations of the 
research and offers suggestions for further research in safety culture. From the 
research and the data collected for NCRA, recommendations are suggested. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This study aimed to determine the key components of effective leadership 
alignment interventions within the safety culture change process. The literature 
review presented in this chapter includes current research on leadership 
alignment and defining safety culture, including presenting a model of safety 
culture, characteristics of a safety culture, and a comparison of culture-based 
safety versus behavior-based safety. The current leadership alignment practices 
within safety management are discussed. Leadership alignment, in combination 
with organizational design and key actions among leaders, is necessary to create 
agreement and direction within organizations. As a new field of safety 
management, the emergence of a safety culture has generated many dimensions 
and insights into the definition, characteristics, and practices of a safety culture, 
while fueling a debate among scholars and practitioners. There is consensus that 
a safety culture impacts an organization’s safety performance; however, there is 
little agreement regarding implementation strategies such as those concerning 
scope, sequence, and methods. 
Leadership Alignment 
Leadership alignment can be characterized as a double-loop learning 
process (Argyris, 1979), where organizations clarify assumptions and 
expectations. Leadership alignment processes move organizations to learn from 
predictable patterns instead of learning from failure cases. Also, leadership 
alignment can reveal an individual employee’s defensive behavior, thus, enabling 
the leader to forecast possible areas of resistance during the implementation 
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stages of change processes. When organizations are proactive and work to 
create leadership alignment, employees’ concerns are addressed, leaders’ past 
behaviors are revealed, and the organization’s predictable response to change is 
surfaced. 
Addressing the emotions associated with leaders at all levels of the 
organization, Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (2002) did work on building 
emotionally intelligent organizations and highlighted three essential components: 
discovering the emotional reality, visualizing the ideal, and sustaining the 
emotional intelligence. Counter to the efficiency culture of most organizations in 
the United States, creating alignment within organizations requires the dedication 
of time to involve employees in dialogue and gather their perspectives. The 
amount of time spent creating this alignment is rarely seen as a value-added 
activity. Additionally, it generally does not produce tangible results at the 
accustomed speed of business. 
It is uncertain how often organizations commit to such an intervention and 
how they measure the return on investment of the intervention. Most 
organizations look for leadership alignment around corporate strategy, vision, 
and goals. While this work is essential for a high-performance organization, it is 
often linear and rational, lacking the emotional aspect to create trust, respect, 
and commitment (Goleman et al., 2002). Questions arise regarding how trust, 
respect, and commitment can be created within organizations, while the progress 
of organizations hinges on their ability to deal with change and align leaders 
around strategic change efforts, rather than just around the mission, vision, and 
goals. 
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The principle of leadership alignment, both vertically and horizontally, 
goes beyond just senior management and is more nuanced than previously 
thought at the lower levels of management (Guth & Macmillan, 1986). O’Reilly, 
Caldwell, and Chatman (2005) studied the effectiveness of implementing a 
strategic initiative in a large health care system and examined the consistency of 
leadership effectiveness across hierarchical levels. This case provides one 
example of how to address the need for and effectiveness of leadership 
alignment. Their results showed when there was leadership alignment, meaning 
all levels of leadership were engaged in the strategic change efforts and there 
was consistency of leadership at different levels within the organization, a 
significant performance improvement followed. O’Reilly et al. concluded, “leaders 
at various levels should be considered collectively to understand how leadership 
influences strategic change” (p. 2). They further suggested that earlier 
researchers “neglected to consider the extent to which leaders at intermediate 
levels (e.g., department or division managers) were aligned in their support for 
the new strategy” (p. 6). The research by O’Reilly et al. provided positive 
evidence for aligning leaders across hierarchical levels to produce effective, 
lasting strategic change by measuring overall patient satisfaction over a 2-year 
period, suggesting that investing the organization’s time and capital in such 
organizational development interventions produces many dividends. 
Recently, Drath et al. (2008) proposed a new leadership framework and 
new leadership ontology—direction, alignment, and commitment (DAC)—
focusing on these practical outcomes to determine if leadership is present within 
organizations. What was intriguing was the addition of alignment to this definition 
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of leadership. This new ontology transcended Bennis’ definition of leadership and 
his tripod theory by suggesting, “the current, widely accepted leadership 
ontology—leadership, followers, and shared goals—is becoming less useful for 
understanding leadership in contexts that are increasingly peer-like and 
collaborative” (p. 635). The new framework moved the leadership dialogue 
forward by specifically focusing on new leadership beliefs and practices which 
create direction, alignment, and commitment. The new framework proposed by 
Drath et al. stated, “leadership is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for 
achieving the longer term purposes and goals of a collective” (p. 636), and DAC 
must be produced as a short-term criterion. It is the reproduction, development, 
and re-creation of DAC that contributes to the long-term outcomes, often the 
desired state at the onset of a strategic change effort. 
The achievement of DAC within an organization allows for cooperation 
and shared work to occur successfully. How DAC is produced is based on beliefs 
and practices within the organization, encompassing some of the components of 
Schein’s (2004) definition of organizational culture. Drath et al. (2008) argued it is 
an individual’s beliefs, along with the collective beliefs about how to produce 
DAC, that construct the social practices within an organization. Bringing attention 
to these shared beliefs becomes the work of organization development 
professionals working within today’s organizations. 
By revealing the social practices and the beliefs within an organization, the 
organization’s current state of DAC becomes useful data for implementing the 
future state. The data gathered through leadership alignment may determine 
areas of misalignment and raise questions such as: what messages are being 
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interpreted by employees, who is considered an informal leader, and how are 
committed employees implementing change? Leadership alignment interventions 
may create a ‘tipping point’ within an organization to catalyze culture change, 
suggesting that if employees perceive all levels of leaders working on alignment 
around the change strategy, then support will follow to fulfill the long-term 
organizational goals. 
Given the current research on leadership theories and practices and, 
specifically, the new leadership framework proposed by Drath et al. (2008), an 
understanding of leadership alignment within the safety culture change process 
would be useful to organizational leaders. According to Drath et al., culture 
change is considered leadership if it works to achieve DAC as an outcome. 
A small body of research connects the role of leadership to establishing a 
positive safety culture. Thompson, Hilton, and Witt (1998) determined that 
workers’ safe behavior is influenced not only by how managers communicate 
about safety issues raised by workers but also by how fairly workers are treated 
by supervisors. In their article “Target Zero: A Culture of Safety,” Burman and 
Evans (2008) cited a case study of the Bristow Group, a civil aviation company 
providing helicopter transportation to the oil and gas industry. Burman and Evans 
distinguished the difference between safety management and safety leadership. 
Recognizing the role of culture in the organization’s safety performance, Burman 
and Evans emphasized the need to create a learning culture that connects all 
level of the organization involved in safety. In the Bristow Group example, this 
would mean aligning the pilots, maintenance crew, supervisors, and executive 
management around the goal of zero accidents. Most closely related to 
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leadership alignment within a safety culture change process is the research 
Zohar and Luria (2003) conducted on supervisor-based safety. 
Defining Safety Culture 
In terms of safety management, much of the focus in the past 10 years 
has been on safety culture. Several catastrophic accidents, including the 
Chernobyl meltdown in the former Soviet Union and the United States’ Space 
Shuttle Columbia explosion, introduced the idea of safety culture to an expansive 
audience and garnered attention to the field of safety culture. As a term, safety 
culture first appeared and was defined in the pioneer study by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency Safety Culture: A report by the International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group (1991). The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group’s 
1988 report explained how the events of the Chernobyl disaster were triggered 
by a lack of knowledge and understanding of risk and safety by employees within 
the organization (cited in International Atomic Energy Agency, 1991). According 
to Choudhry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007), the report described safety culture as 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes, 
as an overriding priority, that nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention 
warranted by their significance. Choudhry et al. argued this report left the 
definition of safety culture open to interpretation, suggested no way of assessing 
safety culture, and believed the definition was not developed theoretically within 
organizational culture. Furthermore, the report made no direct link between 
safety culture and safety performance or safety leadership. 
Since the seminal work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
1991, most safety professionals recognized safety culture as a valid concept; 
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however, the debate regarding what safety culture was continued (Guldenmund, 
2000). The debate gained heat when the causes, content, and consequences 
were examined and continued without an accepted model within the safety field 
(Choudhry et al., 2007; Guldenmund, 2000). In October 2003, after another 
space shuttle explosion, the Columbia Accident Investigative Board, delivered 
information emphasizing how the behavior of the organization and its leadership 
doomed the shuttle. Citing a “broken safety culture,” the Board stated: 
The investigation uncovered a troubling pattern in which Shuttle 
Program management made erroneous assumptions about the 
robustness of a system based on prior success rather than on 
dependable engineering data and rigorous testing. The Shuttle 
Program’s complex structure erected barriers to effective 
communication and its safety culture no longer asks enough hard 
questions about risk. Safety culture refers to an organization’s 
characteristics and attitudes—promoted by its leaders and 
internalized by its members—that serve to make safety the top 
priority. (2003, pp. 184-185) 
Despite the technical expertise of NASA employees, their assumptions 
and perceptions regarding risk and safety, more simply, their complacency along 
with ineffective communication, created a safety culture resulting in a disaster 
and the loss of seven astronauts. The space shuttle accident illustrated a 
paradigm shift in accident investigations where not only was the “what” question 
asked to determine causation, but now the “why” question was asked as well. It 
was within the “why” question that the socio-technical side of the organization 
was examined. However, even with the current understanding of how safety 
culture impacts safety management and leadership, there was no accepted 
model of safety culture (Choudhry et al., 2007). 
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Relevant to assessing safety culture, Schein (2004) believed studying 
culture allowed members of organizations to know what to pay attention to and 
how to make meaning of the world. Studying culture dealt with the feelings and 
emotions experienced by individuals within the organization, creating a set of 
operating assumptions. Schein’s defined organization culture as 
. . . a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a 
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (p. 17) 
Working from this widely accepted definition of organizational culture, the 
comparison of safety culture definitions and their evolution can be made. The 
definition started with what was called a safety climate to the current distinction 
between safety climate and safety culture. Zohar (1980) offered the first widely 
used definition of safety climate in reference to what impacts individual worker 
behavior: “a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their 
work environments” (p. 96). Cox and Cox (1991) distinguished safety culture 
from safety climate by proposing that safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, 
perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety, while Pidgeon 
(1991) suggested safety culture was, “the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, 
and social and technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the 
exposure of employees, managers, customers, and members of the public to 
conditions considered dangerous or injurious” (p. 134). 
In 1996, Lee proposed a comprehensive definition suggesting, “the safety 
culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
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commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, and organisation's health and 
safety management” (p. 2). The definition of safety climate progressed further 
when Cox and Flin (1998) raised the question of whether safety climate was 
synonymous with safety culture, presuming most safety professionals could not 
make the distinction. Moving closer to a recognized definition, Guldenmund 
(2000) clarified safety climate as, “attitudes towards safety within an 
organization” (p. 215) and safety culture as, “the strong convictions or dogmas 
underlying the safety attitudes” (p. 215). Guldenmund’s view was that 
organizational culture, not safety culture, should be the central theme within 
organizations looking to improve safety performance. A few years later, 
Guldenmund (2007) cited the limitations of measuring a safety culture through 
questionnaires that identified the attitudes shared throughout the whole 
company. Given this measurement limitation, he believed safety climate 
(attitudes) and safety culture were indistinguishable and represented different 
approaches to determine the priority of safety within an organization. 
Taking a comprehensive approach from 1998 onward and recognizing the 
surge of interest in the safety culture field in all industries, Choudhry et al. (2007) 
reiterated the lack of accepted definitions for safety climate, safety culture, and 
safety management, suggesting the terms were used interchangeably and that 
safety climate was a byproduct of safety culture. Careful to frame their definition 
within the construction industry, Choudhry et al. (2007) proposed safety culture to 
be 
the product of individual and group behaviors, attitudes, norms and 
values, perceptions and thoughts that determine the commitment 
to, and style and proficiency of, an organization’s system and how 
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its personnel act and react in terms of the company’s ongoing 
safety performance. (p. 1008) 
A Safety Culture Model 
The lack of an accepted definition stemmed from the dynamic nature of 
safety culture or, more broadly, organization culture, which was seen as open 
systems within organizations that must confront internal and external pressures. 
It was widely accepted that safety climate, a dimension of the overall safety 
culture, was a necessary component of safety management because numerous 
structural models had shown it was possible to predict unsafe behavior or 
accidents (Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000; Cheyne, Tomas, Cox, & Oliver, 1999; 
Thompson et al., 1998) and non-linear models (Guastello, 1989; Guastello, 
Gershon, & Murphy, 1999). However, as the field progressed, it was defining the 
dimensions of a safety culture that created the most divide among scholars. 
In 1994, Geller proposed a model with three factors—person, behavior, 
and environment—and 10 principles that provide the foundation for a Total 
Safety Culture. The model advocated for the process to be led by the workforce 
and built around empowered, resourced teams. Geller did not address how the 
safety culture was connected to the overall organization culture and was based 
mostly around the individuals and behaviors, reflecting an approach influenced 
by the behavior-based safety model. This model did shift the thinking from safety 
being a value to safety being a priority. 
Unlike Geller’s (1994) model, Cooper (2000) argued that people, jobs, and 
environment as well as psychological, behavioral, and situational factors 
influenced safety culture. He based his safety culture model on Social Cognitive 
20 
 
Theory. More specifically, Cooper’s model worked from the understanding that 
the interactive and reciprocal relationship between the psychological, behavioral, 
and situational factors not only influenced accident causation models, but also 
led to broader change initiatives like Total Quality Management. While Geller’s 
model did not show a connection to the larger organizational culture, Cooper 
recognized safety culture as a sub-facet of organizational culture, yet did not 
address the assumptions related to safety within the organization. Cooper’s 
(2000) model did address the issue of creating a safety culture product, 
suggesting safety culture initiatives should be goal-directed with many sub-goals 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the work—ultimately reducing injuries and 
accidents and saving lives. According to Cooper’s model, employee’s attitudes 
and perceptions could be assessed by measuring the safety climate through 
questionnaires, checklists, and audits or inspections. 
Implementing a safety culture model required assessing the current safety 
culture of an organization. Several approaches existed. Recognizing the 
evolution in safety management approaches and safety culture assessments, 
Kennedy and Kirwan (1998) proposed the Safety Culture Hazard and Operability 
approach to identify the vulnerabilities within the safety management processes 
and the safety culture factors influencing these vulnerabilities. The approach 
used an accepted methodological framework and analytical process, although it 
was thought to be very resource-intensive. Cox and Cheyne (2000) provided 
another assessment of safety culture published as the “Safety Climate 
Assessment Toolkit.” This toolkit used questionnaires, focus groups, behavioral 
observations, and situational audits to determine the effectiveness of safety 
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management systems. Cox and Cheyne envisioned this data being used to 
stimulate discussion and that the tools would adapt to fit the organization, 
providing a foundation for organizations to learn more about themselves. 
Glendon and Stanton (2000) argued the advancement of safety culture 
assessments through a triangulated methodology was needed. This would 
include safety culture questionnaires, quasi-ethnographic studies, and 
benchmarking of other companies within a culture where safety was measured 
regularly, needed follow up was completed, and learning was shared with others. 
Characteristics of a Safety Culture 
Despite the lack of clarity in a model and the dispute over the dimensions 
of a safety culture, Choudhry et al. (2007) defined or framed the characteristics of 
an organization’s safety culture to be 
. . . one in which safety is regarded by everyone as being an issue 
that concerns everyone. As a result, safety rules should be 
understood and adhered to; all incidents must be reported and 
investigated quickly for actions to be taken, and for increased 
learning. (p. 1003) 
What Choudhry et al. (2007) implied was a set of characteristics defining a 
positive safety culture that in theory could be used to assess safety culture. 
Several studies existed outlining the positive attributes or characteristics of 
a safety culture. Much work had been done to attribute the impact of safety 
culture to major accidents like Chernobyl and the Challenger, but now there was 
emphasis on attributing an organization’s safety culture to individual accidents on 
a much smaller scale. By examining what the safety climate surveys measured, it 
was possible to ascertain the accepted characteristics of a positive safety culture 
(Flin, Mearns, O’Conner, & Bryden, 2000), including management commitment, 
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supervisor competence, prioritizing safety over production (Hale, 2000), and time 
pressure. Compiling 10 studies on 20 companies, Shannon, Mayr, and Haines 
(1997) compared the variables identified with lower injury rates and determined 
three common characteristics: empowerment of the workforce (Choudhry et al., 
2007; Hale, 2000), delegation of safety activities to employees, and top 
management’s participation in health and safety. Conversely, using the same 
comparisons, the use of discipline and the threat to take issues outside the 
health and safety committee correlated to increased injury rates. 
Mearns, Whitaker, and Flin (2003), citing work at off shore environments, 
concluded communication around safety issues such as accident and near miss 
investigations, safety audits, or changes to procedures could be correlated to 
reducing risks. Contrary to the belief that management support (Shannon et al., 
1997) correlated to a decrease in accidents and injuries, Mearns et al. (2003) 
found the opposite to be true, presuming that management support was high, 
because of lower safety performance in preceding years. Furthermore, there was 
limited evidence that management visibility on site discussing safety, often seen 
as management support, improved overall safety performance. However, in this 
research, management commitment was cited as one of the crucial elements to a 
positive safety culture but was not analyzed against accidents and injuries. 
Taylor and Taylor (2008) characterized a positive safety culture as one 
where there was a reporting culture, a just culture, and a learning culture where 
the first requirement was trust (Choudhry et al. 2007; Hale, 2000; Vecchio-Sudus 
& Griffiths, 2004), which outlined acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
Vecchio-Sudus and Griffiths argued there needed to be: management 
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commitment demonstrated when resources are provided; employee involvement, 
ownership, and commitment; recognized changes in safety attitudes and 
behaviors; diverse training on a breadth of safety topics; special campaigns to 
highlight safety initiatives; and promotional strategies to enhance safety 
awareness. These positive characteristics were promoted when the organization 
engaged in proactive, divergent, and judicial thinking. 
Summarizing the debate on the characteristics of a positive safety culture 
in their article, “The Nature of Safety Culture: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art,” 
Choudry et al. (2007) took the position a positive safety culture was one where 
there are five components: 
[1] management commitment to safety; [2] management concerns 
for the workforce; [3] mutual trust and credibility between 
management and employees; [4] workforce empowerment; [5] and 
lastly continuous monitoring, corrective action, review of system 
and continual improvements to reflect the safety at the work site.  
(p. 1005) 
The characteristics of a positive safety culture allowed for the definition, 
methodology, and dimensions to merge into actionable items for an organization. 
The Safety Culture Approach Versus Behavior-Based Safety Approach 
Defining the debate between behavior-based safety performance 
management and safety culture performance management, Cooper (2000) found 
very little research in this area has examined the moderating or 
mediating effects of job-related factors (e.g., team-working, size of 
workgroups, task-complexity, goal-conflicts, task strategies, etc.), 
person factors (goal-commitment, self-efficacy, self-regulation, 
hierarchical level, social status, etc.), and organizational factors 
(e.g., communications, management's commitment, resource 
availability, etc.) on actual safety behaviour and on the 
development of safety culture per se. Similarly, no work has been 
undertaken on the reciprocal relationships between these variables. 
(p. 129) 
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Dejoy (2005) argued the two approaches (behavior change and culture 
change) were complementary and the strengths of both should be used to 
manage safety performance. Behavior-based safety focused safety management 
on individual safety observations and positive feedback with subsequent 
behavior modifications if necessary to reduce injuries and accidents, while 
culture-based safety looked at the influences of culture, specifically beliefs, 
attitudes, and assumptions, on safety behaviors and safety programs. The 
argument for behavior-based safety was that it was easier to observe behaviors 
and produce analytical data, while looking at culture was intuitive and lacking an 
agreed-upon methodology or model. At a deeper level, behavior-based safety 
focused on immediate causes, while culture based safety focused on basic 
causes and took a broader perspective including the environment when 
addressing safety performance. Culture-based safety creates shared leadership 
among employees and management to implement organizational change. 
The two safety management approaches collided when behavior-based 
safety management proponents argued the approach was difficult to manage 
when the organizational culture was non-supportive or dysfunctional (Krause, 
1997), yet, it was believed that employee participation in behavioral observations 
with positive feedback created a positive affect for safety that could lead to 
culture change (Saari, 1992). This assumed culture change was indirect, and 
behavior based safety only worked in supportive, functional, trusting 
environments. Cox, Jones, and Rycraft (2004) recognized trust as an essential 
component to behavior-based programs. Culture change proponents recognized 
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trust as a requirement for safety culture change and directly addressed issues of 
mistrust as a basic cause for accidents and injuries. 
Implementation of these two safety management approaches differ. Dejoy 
(2005) characterized behavior-based safety approaches as bottom-up and 
culture change safety approaches as top-down (Glendon & Stanton 2000), while 
Simon and Frazee (2005) and Simon and Cistaro (2009) suggested a grassroots-
led, management supported safety culture change process. The concept is that 
grassroots teams working on culture change could not succeed without 
management support, and leaders at all levels have to be enlisted and educated. 
Simon and Frazee (2005) provided safety culture change methodologies 
and use the example of the dramatically improved safety performance at General 
Motors North American manufacturing facilities in their article, “Building a Better 
Safety Vehicle: Leadership-Driven Culture Change at General Motors.” This 
seminal work argued that safety culture change efforts could be both top-down 
and bottom-up in approach, challenging the conventional thinking that safety 
culture change was a top-down safety management approach. The President’s 
Council mandated that the manufacturing managers’ council take on the safety 
culture initiative and address the dismal safety performance results. 
Each year, nearly one of three GM workers was being injured 
seriously enough to require medical treatment. Nearly five percent 
of the workforce was being injured seriously enough to miss at least 
one day of work. GM was averaging about four occupational 
fatalities per year. Workers’ compensation costs exceeded $100 
million annually. (p. 36) 
While the effort acknowledged and worked within the GM top-down 
culture, union and management leaders worked together to improve safety. 
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Ultimately, the strategy implemented cascaded down the safety culture change 
efforts from plant leadership to supervisory levels and union committee 
representatives to the shop floor employees. The manufacturing managers’ 
council removed their involvement and turned the process over to plant 
leadership. After a decade long effort, GM had made safety a corporate priority. 
To create a new safety culture at Public Service Electric & Gas, one where 
there was sustainability and longevity, the organization believed they needed a 
top-down and bottom-up approach to advance its safety culture. Public Service 
Electric & Gas initiated three leadership initiatives. One initiative created 
grassroots safety champions through mentoring and coaching and used a 
bottom-up approach. Another initiative developed middle managers’ 
understanding of safety culture and their new role in support of employee-led 
safety. To build internal capacity, an initiative to provide the training for crew 
leaders to use culture-based tools to solve safety issues and concerns was 
formed (Simon & Cistaro, 2009).   
Medina, McSween, Rost, and Alvero (2009), in their article, “Behavioral 
Safety in a Refinery: Large-Scale Change and Long-Term Results,” provided 
results of a behavior-based safety initiative at a refinery and correlated the 
increase in safety observations with the decrease in safety incidents. The 
behavior-based safety approach implemented at this refinery focused on an 
employee-led implementation where employees trained one another, conducted 
safety observations, and published results and actions. The article concluded the 
behavior-based safety program “has become part of the culture” at the Citgo 
refinery (Medina et al., 2009, p. 39), indirectly making the argument that a 
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behavior-based safety program is part of an organization’s safety culture. Dejoy 
(2005) made the argument the research for the two approaches lacked sufficient 
research of randomized, controlled evaluations to provide a recommendation of 
one approach over the other. 
Current Practices of Leadership Alignment within Safety Management 
Frequently, organizations are broken into three groups: management, 
supervision, and front-line employees. While these three groups have vastly 
different responsibilities, how they relate to safety within the organization, based 
on their perceptions and assumptions of safety, impact the overall safety culture 
within an organization. It was recognized that there needed to be leadership at all 
levels of the organization as it related to safety culture. Hofmann and Morgeson 
(1999) were the first to study the effect of leadership on safety records, 
demonstrating the quality of the relationships between group leaders and their 
superiors. The relationship was measured through the leader-member exchange 
level and showed the impact to worker and group safety performance.  
Specifically, the leader’s safety communication and the leader’s declared 
commitment to safety made a positive impact on safety performance for the 
worker group, suggesting a high leader-member exchange level reflected a 
leader’s concern for the safety of workers. There was reciprocity in the supervisor 
worker relationship when the leader-member exchange level was high, promoting 
trust, openness, and loyalty while encouraging leaders to avoid short-term 
production pressures at the cost of safety (Pate-Cornell, 1990) and encouraging 
open communication (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). Ironically, and all too true 
given the space shuttle Columbia’s disaster, after the insights in 1990, Pate-
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Cornell co-authored an article on the risk analysis for the tiles of the space 
shuttle, noting this thermal protection system was one of the shuttle’s critical 
subsystems and was vulnerable to debris hits (Pate-Cornell & Fischbeck, 1993). 
Zohar (2000) showed an empirical link between the safety climate 
perceptions related to supervisory safety practices and worker injuries, as 
measured by microaccidents (minor injuries requiring medical attention). Cooper 
and Phillip (2004) showed similar data were limited safety climate perceptions 
were addressed and suggested that in general, “Changes in climate perceptions 
do not necessarily show changes in behavioral safety performance. Equally, 
changes in behavioral safety performance are not necessarily reflected in 
changes in climate perceptions” (p. 510). This statement insinuated the nuanced 
effect of perceptions and individual behavior recognizing the relationship’s impact 
on an organization’s safety culture. 
Zohar (2002b) suggested that transformational and transactional 
leadership, when augmented, influence safety behavior on group members. 
Specifically, transactional leadership influenced safety through effective 
monitoring, reliability, and predictability, whereas transformational leadership 
influenced safety by providing motivation and concern for others. Recognizing 
the important role of leadership in safety performance, Zohar (2002a) designed a 
leadership intervention model for supervisors. This model focused on increasing 
worker interviews to monitor and reward safety performance while providing 
weekly feedback on the supervisor-worker interactions. These safety-orientation 
interactions by supervisors, emphasizing the priority of safety over production, 
showed a significant decrease in minor injury rates, increased ear plug use, and 
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an increase in safety climate scores. Further developing this intervention, Zohar 
and Luria (2003) suggested adding these safety-orientation interactions between 
line-supervisors and managers higher up the organizational hierarchy along with 
data on employee safety behavior and the relationship of increased supervisor 
interactions with worker safety. The leadership intervention took a behavioral-
based safety approach by measuring the frequency of supervisor safety 
orientations similar to measuring worker safety observations. Additionally, Zohar 
and Luria’s research involved supervisor quality interactions along with safety 
interactions showing an increase in quality and production, suggesting an 
effective supervisor must be able to manage both priorities simultaneously. 
Recognizing the role of leadership in keeping workers safe, supervisor-
based safety was pioneered by Zohar and Luria (2003). Building on the 
supervisor relationship, the researchers demonstrated supervisor priorities must 
align with the strategic priorities of an organization in order to successfully 
implement safety policies and procedures (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Adding a 
technical improvement to the supervisor-based safety intervention by placing 
supervisors physically closer to workers and increasing supervisor visibility 
increased safety-orientation interactions and increased safety performance 
(Luria, Zohar, & Erev, 2008). 
Beyond recording the supervisor safety related exchanges, an intervention 
team in the research study by Luria et al. (2008) provided feedback and coaching 
to first and second line supervisors to improve alignment. Senior management 
was involved in the same process of feedback and coaching around supervisor-
based safety to create alignment across the hierarchy in the organization. 
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Through biweekly feedback and coaching sessions by the intervention team, 
essentially modeling the leadership behaviors to implement a system-wide 
process, the supervisor-based safety process was gradually transferred to the 
organization’s leadership. The alignment process increased the frequency of 
safety-related interactions at all levels and showed decreased injury rates. The 
study recognized that, “ongoing exchanges between leaders and members exert 
a significant effect on leadership as leverage for improving safety” (p. 278). 
Hale (2000) suggested it was necessary to aggregate the data by work 
groups to explain the safety culture at each work group. If the data were 
explained at each work group, then it would be implausible to get an organization 
to adopt one safety culture. This suggests the safety culture may not need to be 
the same for each organizational level. By conducting a safety culture survey of 
construction workers in Hong Kong, Fung, Tam, Tung, and Man (2005) provided 
data showing the safety culture divergences between three groups of workers: 
top management, supervisory staff, and front-line workers. In the study, Fung et 
al. found significant differences between management and worker groups related 
to five areas of safety culture: organizational commitment and communication, 
reporting of accidents and near misses, line management commitment, personal 
role, and workmates’ influence. There was less difference between supervisor 
and worker groups with just two areas showing significant differences: 
organizational commitment and communication and reporting of accidents and 
incidents. Also, there was no significant difference in responses between 
management and supervisor groups. 
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Fung et al. (2005) hypothesized the differences arose from the diversity in 
educational background and sense of responsibility. As solutions to the 
divergence, Fung et al. advocated for promoting safety awareness through 
campaigns, and “a proper and open communication channel has to be 
established among the three groups which can help different levels of staff giving 
their voices on safety issues in order to narrow down the safety culture 
divergences among them” (p. 510). While promoting the need for alignment 
around safety culture, Fung et al. neglected to suggest a method. 
More research is needed related to leadership practices within safety. 
Specifically, Dejoy (2005) identified that few research studies have attempted “to 
create taxonomies of critical supervisory and management behaviors specific to 
safety” (p. 121). Identifying these behaviors for management and supervisors 
would impact the overall safety performance within organizations. By assessing 
the alignment created within a safety culture change process, these behaviors 
might be identified. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methods 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of 
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process. 
Specifically, it examined leadership alignment within the implementation of safety 
culture change process at the NCRA in McPherson, Kansas. The safety culture 
change process was led by Culture Change Consultants, Inc. and was one of 
NCRA’s strategic priorities in order to be recognized as an Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration voluntary protection programs star site for safety 
performance. Researching the implementation efforts of NCRA’s safety culture 
change process provided data into leadership alignment interventions moving 
beyond the assumed role of leadership. This study was conducted in accordance 
with all requirements put forth by the Institutional Review Board for research on 
human subjects. 
Data were collected starting in December 2009 using surveys, interviews, 
and focus groups. There was a need to collect both quantitative and qualitative 
data from employees and stakeholders to identify the structures, messages, and 
training resulting in leadership alignment around the safety culture change 
process. While a survey may have determined whether or not there was 
alignment or misalignment around the safety culture change process, focus 
groups and interviews were conducted to identify the key actions and messages 
from leaders. While leaders are formally identified by title, there are informal 
leaders who may create alignment or misalignment around the safety culture 
change process. 
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Phase 1: Group Survey 
Grassroots team members, guidance team members, supervisors, and 
hourly refinery employees received a paper survey (See Appendix A) 
accompanied by a consent letter from the investigator explaining the purpose of 
the research study (See Appendix B) This quantified the perceived levels of 
alignment or misalignment within each stakeholder group impacted by the safety 
culture change process. Furthermore, related to the safety culture change 
process, the survey addressed levels of commitment, team communication, 
management communication, and perceived priorities within the management 
and hourly employee groups. 
At the refinery, 129 employees completed the paper survey—24 salaried 
and 105 hourly. All responses were confidential. Participation was voluntary and 
anyone could drop out of the study at anytime without risk. 
Phase 2: Focus Groups and Interviews 
Following the survey, once the data were analyzed, focus groups and 
interviews were convened with employee groups to present the data collected. 
The interviews were intended to identify specific group perspectives. Salaried 
and hourly employees were separated to keep the comments from affecting 
employee-supervisory relationships. The interviews were semi-structured around 
the paper survey questions. The interviews generally lasted 1 hour and were in-
depth in order to know and understand employee experiences. 
In total, 16 interviews were conducted to address perceptions, meanings, 
and assumptions of the safety culture change process at NCRA. In total, 25 
employees were interviewed, including nine salaried and 16 hourly employees. 
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Of the interviewees, three employees were guidance team members and eight 
employees were grassroots team members. 
Before beginning the focus groups with hourly employees, participants 
were asked to keep all comments confidential. As an added measure of 
protection, individual interviews were offered to anyone who wished to share their 
views in private. The interviewer had established rapport and trust with the 
respondents through previous interactions on safety culture grassroots teams 
and the guidance team. The interview data were recorded using a note-taking 
method. The responses were anonymous and identified by salaried or hourly as 
well as by team member and non-team member status. Additionally, focus group 
comments from hourly employees were associated only with participants’ job 
classification as operations, maintenance, or safety. For salary and supervision 
employees, only survey and private interviews were conducted to ensure 
confidentiality. Focus group and interview participants were pulled from subjects 
completing the survey on a voluntary basis. Emphasis was placed on identifying 
personal actions, group projects, and safety messages that created alignment or 
misalignment within the safety culture change process. 
Phase 3: Data Analysis 
From the research methods in Phase 1 and 2, the data were analyzed to 
determine what key components of effective leadership within the safety culture 
change process created alignment or misalignment. To determine the degree of 
leadership alignment for this initiative, a paper survey was administered to 
salaried and hourly employees. Their positive responses on the paper survey 
determined alignment within the safety culture change process. To identify what 
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actions contributed to creating leadership alignment and surface the necessary 
actions to move towards stronger leadership alignment, interviews also were 
conducted with employee groups. Specifically, leaders’ actions, communication 
about the safety culture change process, the organization development 
interventions, and the team structures were identified and prioritized according to 
the interview data. 
Survey Analysis 
Survey data were compiled and analyzed using Stata software and the 
following modeling process: (a) cleaning the data, (b) conducting a quick factor 
analysis, (c) compositing the data according to factor analysis and intuition, (d) 
selecting the most internally consistent composites, (e) justifying the reasons for 
choices to avoid Type 1 error by running too many tests, (f) analyzing whether 
Q1 through Q4 predict C4 or C6, (g) explaining why Q2 was bifurcated and why 
Q4 was ignored, and (h) parsing out variables of interest for tabular graphics. 
The objective of the analysis was to identify relationships between work-
related demographic indicators and workplace attitudes. Given the large number 
of items on the survey and the even greater number of possible permutations of 
data inquiries, it was necessary to avoid blindly building models that would yield 
statistically significant findings merely as a product of random chance. To limit 
Type 1 error, clear-cut hypotheses were developed before running a series of 
regression analyses. 
The qualitative research that guided the survey design suggested that four 
work-related demographic indicators were associated with differences in 
workplace attitudes. It was hypothesized that: 
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1. Hourly versus salaried employees experienced the workplace 
differently. 
2. Grassroots and guidance team members were more likely to 
understand workplace roles and responsibilities than their non-team member 
peers. 
3. More tenured employees would be less cooperative than their neophyte 
colleagues. 
4. Affiliation with a particular employee division (safety, operations, 
maintenance) impacted attitude towards the safety culture change process. 
Unfortunately, because there was no perfect linear relationship between 
the categorical classifications of the demographic factors of interest, the 
challenge was to draft intelligent hypotheses that did not require a multiplicity of 
indicator variables and accompanying statistical tests, thereby, increasing the 
researcher’s likelihood of committing Type 1 error. For the fourth demographic 
factor (employee division), the data were not dichotomized into the three 
response categories. Instead, the first three demographic factors were selected 
to provide the basis of the analysis. Given the understanding of workplace 
dynamics in this refinery, it was believed that demographic factors 1-3 would 
better serve the inquiry. For demographic factor 2, again seeking to decrease 
Type 1 error, the response categories were bifurcated into two groupings of 
"team membership" and "no team membership". 
To continue the analysis, it was necessary to determine a set of 
underlying latent constructs, each of which represented a particular area of work-
related perceptions. There was a need to better understand how employee 
37 
 
position and ranking was associated with sentiments about workplace 
circumstances. The survey was built with several separate constructs in mind. 
After an initial factor analysis, the data showed that some items did not group 
together as expected and were investigated further by determining the 
Cronbach's Alpha value for the clusters of items believed to belong within each 
individual construct (See Tables 1 and 2). A pair of orthogonal constructs, 
addressing "alignment" and "role of teams," demonstrated high overall Alpha 
values (0.80 and 0.78, respectively). Alignment is referred to as Composite 1 and 
“role of teams” as Composite 2. 
After obtaining two internally consistent constructs, it was possible to 
create a parsimonious model to determine the demographic factors that were 
most predictive of scores on these two composite indices. Two final models were 
built using stepwise regression, performing separate tests of independent 
variables before expanding the model. 
Table 1 
Standardized, Inter-Item Correlations for Composite 1 (Alignment) 
 
N = 129 
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Table 2 
Standardized, Inter-Item Correlations for Composite 2 (Role of Teams) 
 
N = 129 
 
The first model in the final analysis revealed a statistically significant 
relationship between the "alignment" composite and demographic factor 1 (hourly 
versus salaried). The coefficient on the predictor variable (0.553) described the 
positive association between "alignment" score and salaried employees. In 
context, it showed, on average, salaried employees scored 0.553 points higher 
on the "alignment" index than hourly employees (See Table 3). The t-value of 
4.41 and the corresponding p-value of < 0.0001 suggested a robust finding 
unlikely to be the result of random chance. 
Table 3 
Ordinary Least-Squares Regression, Composite 4 (Alignment) on Question 1 
(Hourly/Salaried) 
 
N = 129 
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The second model in the final analysis found an intuitive result, showing 
strong association of "role of teams" to both demographic factors 1 and 2 (team 
membership). The respective coefficients of the two predictors (0.699 and            
-0.491) explained that (a) salaried employees, on average, scored 0.699 points 
higher on the "role of teams" index and that (b) team members scored 0.491 
points higher on the "role of teams" index than their non-team member peers 
(See Table 4). The statistical analysis verified a logical assumption: Team 
members better understood the role of teams within the safety culture change 
process and could express that sentiment. The t-value of 5.18 and the 
corresponding p-value of <0.0001 suggested a robust finding unlikely to be the 
result of random chance. 
Table 4 
Ordinary Least-Squares Regression, Composite 6 (Role of Teams) on Question 
2 (Teams/Non-Team) and Question 1 (Hourly/Salaried) 
 
N = 128 
 
Focus Group and Interview Analysis 
In analyzing the data, salaried and hourly employee comments were 
separated and the non-team member and team member descriptors were 
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deleted for anonymity. Low-inference descriptive codes were used to make 
sense of the initial responses. An open-coding approach was used to make 
comparisons and to generate further questions. The codes used were: salaried 
employees’ actions around safety, hourly employees’ actions around safety, 
guidance team and grassroots team structure, grassroots team projects, 
guidance team projects, the changes in safety since the safety culture change 
process began, and communication about safety. 
The open-coding approach led to more specific targets. Based on the 
quantitative data, leaders’ actions, team membership experiences, and how 
hourly and salaried employees viewed the company’s commitment to the safety 
culture change process were targeted in the coding. Higher-inference pattern 
codes were used to bring together the descriptive codes, or indicators, into 
themes. 
In total, five themes were created: (a) both salaried and hourly employees’ 
actions showed commitment to the safety culture change process, (b) guidance 
team and grassroots team structures created alignment within the safety culture 
change process, (c) grassroots team and guidance team projects impacted the 
direction of the safety culture change process, (d) the overall perceptions of 
safety changed as a result of the safety culture change process, and (e) 
communication of safety and the safety culture change process mattered to 
employees (see summary of themes chart). While coding, memoing was used to 
theorize about the data reviewed. At the same time, conclusions were drawn 
regarding the data by integrating the qualitative data with the quantitative data. 
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Lastly, the research data was gathered from January 2010 through 
February 2010. At the beginning of 2010, there was an increase in incidents and 
injuries and a contractor fatality, the first in NCRA’s 65-year history. These 
events may have influenced both the quantitative and qualitative responses from 
employees. Following the research study, a brief overview of the results was 
provided to NCRA employees. When requested, the full research study was 
shared electronically with employees. 
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Chapter 4 
Findings 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of 
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process. 
Specifically, it examined leadership alignment within the implementation of safety 
culture change process at the NCRA in McPherson, Kansas. The safety culture 
change process was led by Culture Change Consultants, Inc. and was one of 
NCRA’s strategic priorities in order to be recognized as an Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration voluntary protection programs star site for safety 
performance. Researching the implementation efforts of NCRA’s safety culture 
change process provided data into leadership alignment interventions moving 
beyond the assumed role of leadership. Chapter 4 presents the five key research 
findings of leadership alignment within a safety culture change process at NCRA. 
Key findings for this study are as follows: 
1. Both salaried and hourly employees’ actions showed commitment to the 
safety culture change process. The qualitative data suggested salaried 
employees were more aware of actions that demonstrated commitment to the 
safety culture change process. Both hourly and salaried employees regarded 
allocating time and spending funds on the safety culture change process and 
taking the time to listen as showing commitment. While salaried employees 
identified specific behaviors of salaried leadership that demonstrated 
commitment to safety, such as visibility in the refinery, honest dialogue, 
apologizing, and following safety policies and procedures, hourly employees did 
not mention these behaviors. Salaried employees routinely spoke of how hourly 
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employees showed a high level of commitment to the safety culture change 
process by participating during unpaid time. Hourly employees did not refer to 
unpaid time. That said, the quantitative data from salaried employees on the 
survey were more positive than hourly employee data. Both the qualitative and 
quantitative data suggested the horizontal alignment between salaried 
employees was stronger than the horizontal alignment of hourly employees 
within the safety culture change process. Additionally, the data suggested the 
vertical alignment between salaried employees and hourly employees within the 
safety culture change process was disconnected. 
2. Guidance team and grassroots team structure created alignment within 
the safety culture change process. The qualitative data showed the guidance 
team and grassroots team structure created alignment within the safety culture 
change process. The guidance team and grassroots teams were made up of 
both salaried and union employees with the grassroots teams being coached by 
a member of the guidance team. Both salaried and hourly employees believed 
the heterogeneity of employee levels on the guidance team and grassroots 
teams mattered. The team structure without a hierarchy and with each member 
having one vote allowed both employee groups to believe hourly employees had 
ownership within the safety culture change process. This alignment of employees 
participating on teams was reinforced by the quantitative data showing higher 
responses by employees on safety culture change teams. Even though there 
were more hourly employees participating on safety culture change teams, hourly 
employees responded with lower scores. These data suggested hourly 
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employees were unaware of the level of hourly employee ownership in the safety 
culture change process. 
3. Grassroots team and guidance team projects impacted the direction of 
the safety culture change process. According to the qualitative data, the 
grassroots team and guidance team projects impacted the direction of the safety 
culture change process. The projects were visible and reinforced the attention 
given to improve the safety culture at NCRA. Hourly employees believed the 
grassroots team projects demonstrated how hourly and salaried employees 
worked in partnership, and non-team members were asked for input on the 
projects. 
The guidance team project that created a new safety incentive program 
built on choice, ownership, and participation was seen as improving safety at the 
refinery. Hourly and salaried employees believed the safety incentive program 
gave employees ownership of their personal safety. Additionally, salaried 
employees cited an increase in safety reporting and an increase in safety 
communication at the 8:00 am meetings. Hourly employees believed the new 
incentive program increased the number of safety meetings from one to five on a 
voluntary basis. While the comments were positive regarding the new safety 
incentive program, few employees recognized the program as a safety culture 
guidance team project. This may have influenced the lower responses of hourly 
employees on the survey. 
4. The overall perceptions of safety changed as a result of the safety 
culture change process. Employees’ actions showing commitment, the guidance 
team and grassroots team structure, and the safety culture change projects 
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emerged as themes from the qualitative data that influenced perceptions of 
safety at NCRA. Data suggested both hourly and salaried employees believed 
the safety culture change process influenced the decision to have both employee 
groups participate in root cause accident investigations. Because of the open and 
candid dialogue between hourly and salaried employees on guidance and 
grassroots teams, many employees felt they could now speak openly and 
honestly about safety. As a result of the safety culture change process, salaried 
employees believed the company was taking time to operate safely, and hourly 
employees felt they would stop a fellow employee working unsafely regardless of 
repercussions. 
5. Communication of safety and the safety culture change process 
mattered to employees. According to the qualitative data, the way in which safety 
and the safety culture change process was communicated presented another 
theme. Salaried employees believed the company was headed in the right 
direction and there was alignment within the company for the safety culture 
change process. Salaried employees recognized how their actions and how they 
communicated influenced the safety perceptions of hourly employees. Both 
groups believed fellow employees were more serious about safety since starting 
the safety culture change process, as shown by the increased communication 
about safety procedures, reporting, and concerns. Increased communication was 
attributed to the open dialogue between hourly and salaried employees (see 
Table 5). 
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Table 5 
Summary of Themes from Qualitative Data 
Themes Hourly Employee 
Responses 
Salary Employee Responses 
1. Employees’ 
actions showed 
commitment to the 
safety culture 
change process. 
• Given time to attend 
safety culture 
change meetings 
and providing 
monetary resources 
for safety culture 
change process. 
• Leaders taking the 
time to listen first to 
concerns rather than 
to just react. 
• Employees assume 
leaders are 
insincere when 
talking about safety. 
 
• Give time to attend safety culture 
change meetings and provide 
monetary resources for safety 
culture change process. 
• Leaders take the time to listen first to 
concerns and not just react, engage 
in honest and candid dialogue, and 
apologize for making mistakes 
during the leadership alignment 
dialogues. 
• Leaders follow safety policies and 
procedures, be visible (on site) 
within the refinery or plant, provide 
detailed and specific safety 
information at every meeting, 
respond to safety concerns in a 
timely manner, and remind people if 
safety policies and procedures are 
not followed. 
2. Guidance team 
and grassroots team 
structure created 
alignment within the 
safety culture 
change process. 
• Hourly and salaried 
employees 
participate on the 
same teams. 
• Have shared 
ownership of the 
process. 
 
• Joint decision making and open 
communication—one vote, one 
person--and employees from all 
levels. 
• Hourly employees work directly with 
upper management, have shared 
ownership of the safety culture 
change process, and leadership 
opportunities are created. 
• Unsure about how to support the 
process if they are not on a team. 
3. Grassroots team 
and guidance team 
projects impacted 
the direction of the 
safety culture 
change process. 
• Working with 
salaried employees 
to complete 
projects. 
• Grassroots teams 
are presenting 
projects at safety 
meetings and asking 
for input on the 
projects from peers. 
• The increased signage project is 
making a difference. 
• The grassroots team projects make 
the safety culture change process 
more visible and reinforce the 
message of safety culture change. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Themes Hourly Employee Responses Salary Employee Responses 
4. The overall 
perceptions of 
safety changed as 
a result of the 
safety culture 
change process. 
• Joint participation with 
salaried employees in root 
cause accident 
investigations. 
• Open dialogue about 
safety between hourly and 
salaried employees. 
• Willing to say to one 
another “This is how we do 
it safely,” regardless of 
repercussions. 
• All employees can speak 
openly about safety now. 
• Upper management is 
participating in root cause 
accident investigations. 
• Company is taking the time to 
operate safely. 
5. Communication 
of safety and the 
safety culture 
change process 
mattered to 
employees. 
• Feel the selection process 
for guidance team and 
grassroots team members 
is unclear. 
• Feel they are not receiving 
communication about the 
guidance team and there is 
no constant update about 
the safety culture change 
process in a uniformed 
format. 
• Communication at all levels 
about the safety culture change 
process, but needs to get 
better. 
• Communication from the 
grassroots teams at monthly 
supervisor meetings and 
communication from the safety 
department about the guidance 
team and grassroots teams is 
effective. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the key components of 
effective leadership alignment within the safety culture change process. 
Specifically, it looked at leadership alignment within the implementation of safety 
culture change process at the NCRA in McPherson, Kansas. Researching the 
implementation efforts of NCRA’s safety culture change process provided data 
regarding leaders’ actions, employee perceptions, and leadership alignment 
interventions. This chapter presents conclusions, recommendations to managers, 
recommendations to organization development professionals, limitations of the 
research, and suggestions for further research. 
1. The safety culture change process at NCRA was successful. The 
NCRA safety culture assessment was completed in September 2008, and the 
findings were reported back in November 2008. The safety culture change 
process at NCRA began when the guidance team, comprised of hourly and 
salaried employees, was formed in January 2009 and tasked with feeding back 
the safety culture report to all employees. In April 2009, four safety culture 
grassroots teams formed to work on projects generated from the issues identified 
in the safety culture survey report and during the survey feedback session. 
In 2007 and 2008, the recordable accidents and injury rate at NCRA was 
3.2 and 3.1. In 2009, the accident and injury rate was 2.0 (See Table 6). Also, in 
2008, the lost time cases rate and lost work days went from 1.4 and 18.8, 
respectively, to 0.0 and 0.0 in 2009. All three indicators presented a down trend 
in rates and an increase in safety performance for 2009 (See Figure 1). During 
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the interviews, both hourly and salaried employees believed the improved safety 
performance was a result of the safety culture change process. 
Table 6 
National Cooperative Refinery Association Total Lost Time, Restricted Day, and 
Lost Work Days Versus National Petroleum Refining Association Total Cases 
Year 
Total 
Cases 
Lost time 
cases 
Restricted day and 
lost time cases 
Lost work 
days 
NPRA Total 
cases 
NPRA Lost 
time cases 
2000 5.7 1.3 2.6 41.9 1.8 0.4 
2001 5.5 1.4 2.2 54.9 1.8 0.4 
2002 4.0 1.3 2.1 44.4 1.6 0.4 
2003 7.2 2.1 4.4 54.0 1.5 0.4 
2004 7.0 2.1 3.4 22.0 1.2 0.3 
2005 7.4 2.7 4.2 126.0 1.1 0.3 
2006 4.2 0.7 1.9 6.3 0.9 0.2 
2007 3.1 0.7 1.4 17.6 0.9 0.3 
2008 3.2 1.4 1.8 18.8 0.7 0.2 
2009 2.0 0.0 0.5 0.0  1.1 0.8 
Note. From unpublished data, NCRA Safety Department Database. McPherson, KS: NCRA. 
Retrieved April 13, 2010. Reprinted with permission.; NPRA = National Petroleum Refining 
Association 
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Retrieved April 13, 2010. Reprinted with permission.; NPRA = National Petroleum Refining 
Association 
 
Figure 1 
National Cooperative Refinery Association Total Lost Time, Restricted Day, and 
Lost Work Days Versus National Petroleum Refining Association Total Cases 
Through May 2010 
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2. Continuing the safety culture change process is necessary to improve 
NCRA’s safety performance. As of April 2010, there were 3.3 recordable injuries 
(see Table 7). The increase in recordable incidents and injuries in 2010 
suggested the efforts to improve the safety culture at NCRA lost momentum. The 
company received a NPRA Gold Award recognizing facilities with a 25% or 
greater reduction in the Total Recordable Incidence Rate with no workplace-
related fatality of an employee or non-employee during 2009, as compared to the 
average Total Recordable Incidence Rate for the three previous calendar years. 
This recognition may have influenced managers and employees to feel they had 
done enough to stay safe. However, to improve safety culture and safety 
performance requires attention to detail and employee perceptions of safety 
within the organization. Leaders must make a commitment to stay the course and 
continue to build the capacity and structures to improve safety culture. 
Table 7 
National Cooperative Refinery Association Total Lost Time, Restricted Day, and 
Lost Work Days Versus National Petrochemical and Refiner’s Association Total 
Cases through May 2010 
Year 
Total 
Cases 
Lost time 
cases 
Restricted day and 
lost time cases 
Lost work 
days 
NPRA Total 
cases 
NPRA Lost 
time cases 
2000 5.7 1.3 2.6 41.9 1.8 0.4 
2001 5.5 1.4 2.2 54.9 1.8 0.4 
2002 4.0 1.3 2.1 44.4 1.6 0.4 
2003 7.2 2.1 4.4 54.0 1.5 0.4 
2004 7.0 2.1 3.4 22.0 1.2 0.3 
2005 7.4 2.7 4.2 126.0 1.1 0.3 
2006 4.2 0.7 1.9 6.3 0.9 0.2 
2007 3.1 0.7 1.4 17.6 0.9 0.3 
2008 3.2 1.4 1.8 18.8 0.7 0.2 
2009 2.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.1  0.8 
2010 3.3 0.7 0.7 42.2   
Note. From unpublished data, NCRA Safety Department Database. McPherson, KS: NCRA. 
Retrieved April 13, 2010. Reprinted with permission.; NPRA = National Petroleum Refining 
Association 
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During 2009, employees frequently raised the issue of improper use of fall 
protection. The norms and assumptions around fall protection identified potential 
risks to employees. Tragically, on February 9, 2010, a contractor worker was 
killed on the refinery work site. A piece of scaffolding broke and the contractor 
was not properly wearing fall protection. While the contractor was not a NCRA 
employee, employees showed sympathy and concern. A joint hourly and salaried 
committee was convened to investigate the accident and all use of scaffolding 
was suspended for 2 weeks. The employees cited the safety culture change 
process as the reason for the joint committee and the open, honest dialogue from 
leaders. There was commitment from leaders to continue the safety culture 
change efforts and to support a culture where employees learn from mistakes. 
3. The guidance team and grassroots team structure created alignment 
and helped sustain the safety culture change process. According to Dejoy 
(2005), one of the strengths of culture-based safety was creating shared 
leadership among employees and management to implement organizational 
change. O’Reilly et al. (2005) provided research on leadership alignment 
suggesting leaders at all levels should be considered to understand how they 
were aligned in support of new strategies, specifically at intermediate levels. The 
research findings suggested higher levels of alignment around the safety culture 
change process from safety culture “team members” versus “non- team 
members.” 
From an organizational design perspective, Simon and Frazee (2005) 
suggested safety culture change could be designed as both top-down and 
bottom-up in approach. The safety culture guidance team at NCRA, comprised of 
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hourly and salaried leaders, vice presidents, supervisors, and union leaders 
structurally created alignment vertically within the organization. Membership on 
the guidance team was carefully thought out and agreed upon jointly by 
management and union leadership. The heterogeneity of employee levels 
allowed the guidance team to look collectively at leadership within the refinery. 
The safety culture team structure created shared ownership of the process and 
joint participation from employee levels. The structure was able to be maximized 
following the contractor fatality in February 2010. Grassroots team 5 planned a 
safety culture change project aimed at changing the norms and assumptions 
related to fall protection. Its objective was to create the norm that all employees 
wear fall protection every time fall protection was needed. 
The membership of four safety culture grassroots teams in April 2009 
were made up of mostly hourly employees with one salaried supervisor and one 
member of the guidance team functioning as the coach (Simon & Cistaro, 2009). 
Again, the organization design created vertical alignment and allowed for 
collective thought to be considered as the safety culture change process was 
implemented. The survey data suggested alignment was created through the 
team structure as evidenced by the higher positive responses by “team 
members” than “non team members.” 
In organizations that are peer-like and collaborative, similar to the 
guidance team and grassroots team structure, Drath et al. (2008) suggested a 
new definition for leadership was needed to inform leaders’ actions beyond 
leadership, followers, and shared goals. Drath et al. (2008) stated that leadership 
should focus on direction, alignment, and commitment as short-term criterion, 
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which should be seen as an iterative process to produce long-term goals. Both 
the grassroots teams and the guidance team assessed their effectiveness in 
September 2009 during a team health check. The team health check allowed 
team members to assess how their team was functioning and the effectiveness 
of their safety culture change project. The grassroots teams recognized how not 
following the team ground rules and not adhering to team roles and 
responsibilities impacted their effectiveness. Additionally, the grassroots teams 
identified they had not been following their initial project plan and had lost 
direction. The process reflected the creation of direction, alignment, and 
commitment as short-term goals for team members to improve safety 
performance at NCRA. 
4. Leadership alignment dialogues for supervisors impacted the 
supervisors’ perceptions of safety. The research findings found salaried 
employees responded more positively than hourly employees on the paper 
survey. The principle of leadership alignment was more nuanced at lower levels 
of management than at the upper management levels (Guth & Macmillan, 1986). 
Within the safety culture change process, leadership alignment dialogues 
addressed issues of horizontal and vertical alignment between supervisors and 
upper management, but not with hourly employees. 
In the group interviews, salaried employees commented on the impact of 
the leadership alignment dialogues. Salaried employees believed upper 
management allowed for open and honest dialogue about safety issues and 
demonstrated leadership by apologizing for mistakes. 
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Additionally, Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) were the first to study the 
effect of leadership on safety records and demonstrated the value of the 
relationship between group leaders and their superiors and the positive impact 
on employee and group safety performance. Salaried employees noticed an 
increase in communication about safety at daily meetings and open and honest 
communication at the leadership alignment dialogues. Direction, alignment, and 
commitment were being created around the safety culture change process as a 
result of the improved relationship between supervisors and upper management 
at the leadership alignment dialogue sessions and in daily meetings. 
Recommendations to Managers 
The research findings inform discussions of future recommendations to 
managers seeking to create vertical and horizontal alignment within a safety 
culture change process. For instance, it is unknown if safety culture team 
membership causes greater understanding of "role of teams," or if those 
individuals with pre-existing greater understanding of "role of teams" were 
thereby more likely to join a team. Although the directionality of this association 
remains unknown, results suggested the following recommendations. 
1. Team membership should be encouraged and more widely 
implemented as a follow-up to the data findings, suggesting team members were 
more aligned than non-team members. Team membership encouraged 
participation and collaboration from employees in the overall safety process at 
NCRA. The cross-functional teams created a networked group of employees able 
to address specific norms and assumptions within the NCRA safety culture. 
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2. Prior to selecting team members, a team member skill matrix should be 
created for heterogeneous teams, identifying team member skills and employees 
who are informal leaders and influencers. 
3. Given the survey data showing salaried employees responded more 
positively than hourly employees, managers should continue the leadership 
alignment dialogue workshops. Beyond the 18 managers currently participating 
in the workshops at NCRA, the remaining managers should begin the workshops 
within 6 months to maintain continuity in the safety culture change effort. 
4. The practice of supervisors making personal commitments to safety and 
being accountable to their peers should become standard practice for 
evaluations. One of the deliverables to the leadership alignment dialogue 
workshops was supervisors making personal commitments to safety. Supervisor 
interviews suggested the commitments impacted safety performance. Data 
should be gathered from peers and supervised employees as well as self-reports 
as to whether the personal commitments were fulfilled. The practice allowed 
supervisors to be conscious of their actions and the messages communicated 
around safety. 
Recommendations to Organization Development Professionals 
1. It is recommended the alignment survey be given to specific units within 
the company instead of distributing a company-wide survey. This would allow for 
targeted interventions in specific units at the refinery based on the level of true 
alignment, skewed alignment, or forced alignment. Not only would targeting 
specific units be cost effective to clients, but also the organization development 
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professionals and internal culture change champions would be able to generate 
useful learning data to be used with future company units. 
2. To create horizontal alignment of hourly employees, similar to the 
leadership alignment dialogues for supervisors, it is recommended that 
leadership alignment dialogues be completed with targeted units. Based on 
Zohar’s (2002b) research, suggesting transformational leadership influenced 
safety performance when supervisors provided encouragement and showed 
concern for others, the alignment dialogues would target the relationship 
between supervisors and hourly employees. The alignment dialogues for hourly 
employees and supervisors would assess whether the supervisors’ priorities 
align with the organization’s strategic priorities to successfully implement safety 
policies and procedures (Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
3. A formal structure to coach upper management on safety culture 
change communications and actions should be created. The coaching would 
focus on creating alignment, direction, and commitment to sustain the safety 
culture change efforts, while dialoguing about short-term and long-term goals. 
Upper management would have bi-monthly calls with a safety culture change 
coach and specifically focus on leadership actions designed to create alignment, 
both horizontally and vertically within the organization. 
Limitations 
1. Administering a voluntary, paper survey to employees showed a limited 
response rate. In the future, an electronic survey may lend itself to a higher 
response rate and include the majority of refinery employees. More specifically, 
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the language used for the survey questions could be refined and piloted before 
administering future surveys. 
2. The research study gathered the qualitative data using a note-taking 
method instead of recording the interviews. The qualitative data were influenced 
by the interviewer’s biases and the accuracy of the respondents’ memories. 
Future research may include recording the interviews to allow for a researcher to 
analyze the specific language used by employees, working from the perspective 
that language is the central feature of the socio-cultural situation (Punch, 2005). 
3. Lastly, the research study occurred over a 2-month time period, limiting 
the ability to collect data at multiple points within the safety culture change 
process. Collecting data at multiple points over the course of at least 1 year 
would allow for more data to be analyzed. Specific interventions, like leadership 
alignment dialogues, supervisor dialogues in specific units, and upper 
management coaching, could be assessed in relation to a larger time frame. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
1. When planning further research, it is helpful to recognize addressing 
employee needs should focus on structural groupings, not years of experience 
within the refinery. It was surprising to find that demographic factor 3 lacked 
association with the constructs of interest (“alignment” and “role of teams”). The 
stepwise regression model-building technique would have revealed any 
significant relationship between the composites and this factor, even if it were 
less strongly correlated than connections with other demographic factors. For this 
set of data, it can be argued there was no evidence to suggest any relationship 
between duration of employment and the workplace attitudes measured. Given 
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this data, further research regarding supervisor and employee relationships and 
grassroots and guidance team experiences could provide insights into 
demographic factors influencing the process. 
2. Also, it is unknown if the September 2009 team health check 
intervention created direction, alignment, and commitment within the safety 
culture change process. The team health check intervention was designed to 
calibrate and align the grassroots and guidance teams. The anecdotal feedback 
from team members and coaches was positive. A longitudinal study on the 
effectiveness of team health check interventions within the safety culture change 
process is suggested. 
3. Lastly, continued research on leadership alignment within a safety 
culture change process is suggested at NCRA and other client organizations to 
identify leaders’ actions, employees’ commitment, and overall safety 
performance. Further research is needed to discover how alignment, direction, 
and commitment are built through employee networks. A longitudinal study on 
leadership alignment is suggested to provide enough data to track alignment 
throughout a safety culture change process, which lasts 5 to 7 years at a single 
site. 
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Appendix A 
Survey
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Please circle the best answer to each survey item. 
 
1. Which best describes you? 
1. Hourly 
2. Salaried 
 
2. Which best describes you? 
1. Member of a grassroots team 
2. Member of the guidance team 
3. Neither 
 
3. How many years have you been employed at NCRA? 
1. 0 to 5 years 
2. 6 to 10 years 
3. 11 to 20 years 
4. 20+ years 
 
4. What unit best identifies where you work? 
1. Operations 
2. Maintenance 
3. Safety 
 
5. I think the union and salaried employees are working together in the safety 
culture change efforts. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
6. Hourly employees show commitment to the safety culture change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
7. Management and supervisors show commitment to the safety culture change 
process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
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8. I understand my role in the overall safety culture change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
9. I know what the guidance team and grassroots teams do. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
10. The grassroots teams communicate the results of their safety culture change 
projects. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
11. The guidance team regularly communicates the goals of the safety culture 
change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
12. Management and supervisors regularly communicate the importance of 
safety culture in our daily work routines. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
13. Management and supervision encourage employees to share safety 
concerns and report near misses. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
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14. Management and supervisors are on the same page when they talk about the 
safety culture change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
15. The grassroots teams’ projects have made a difference in the safety of our 
employees. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
16. The guidance team projects have made a difference in the overall safety of 
the refinery. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
17. Management and supervision see the safety culture change as a strategic 
priority at NCRA. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
18. Our community expects safety to be our first priority. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
19. Supervisors and management share the same high level of commitment to 
the safety culture change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
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20. Management and supervision believe safety is #1. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
21. Management and supervision share the same priorities when safety and 
production seem to be in conflict. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
22. Management and supervision share the same belief about what is acceptable 
and unacceptable risk levels. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
23. For the most part, I feel we are aligned as a work group/unit around the 
safety culture change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
24. Management and supervision take the time to address comments and 
concerns regarding the safety culture change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
25. The leadership focuses attention and resources on the safety culture change 
process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
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26. The grassroots teams and guidance team structure supports the safety 
culture change process. 
1. Not true 
2. Seldom true 
3. Occasionally true 
4. Mostly true 
5. Definitely true 
 
71 
 
Appendix B 
Consent Form
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Dear NCRA employee, 
 
My name is Nicholas Krump, and I work with Culture Change Consultants aiming 
to create a premier culture of safety at NCRA. As a graduate student at 
Pepperdine University, I am interested in learning your perspectives on how we 
are doing in regard to creating a culture of safety. Specifically, the objectives of 
my research thesis are to determine: 
 
1. the degree of leadership alignment for this initiative 
2. what actions have contributed to creating leadership alignment 
3. necessary actions to move towards stronger leadership alignment. 
 
Specifics of the research include: 
 
• The survey, focus groups, and interviews are voluntary. 
• Your job status will not be affected whether you participate or not; you can 
choose to withdraw at any time. 
• The data collected will remain anonymous. Your name will never be 
associated with any opinions. 
 
If you have questions regarding the study, please contact Miriam Y. Lacey, Ph.D. 
at [contact information omitted]. 
 
If you would like to participate in helping us look at improving our safety culture, 
please sign below to show your consent. 
 
Thank you, 
 
 
Nicholas Krump 
 
_______________________   ________________________ 
Participant’s Signature   Date 
 
 
_______________________ 
Participant’s Printed Name 
 
